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Introduction and summary
The disastrous famine in Somalia is the worst the world has seen in 20 years, and 
it again casts a harsh spotlight on the situation in that country. With millions of 
people now at risk of starvation, and appalling stories of human hardship dominat-
ing the evening news, the name “Somalia” once again conjures images of crisis and 
despair—a famished, suffering country peopled by pirates, terrorists, and warlords. 
Somalia is best known for the civil war and famine of the early 1990s, which killed 
some 250,000 people and triggered a massive, U.S.-led humanitarian interven-
tion that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1994. More 
recently, the rise of indigenous Islamist movements in southern Somalia has 
rekindled fears that the anarchic territory could—or has—become a safe haven 
for Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist movements. 
Major financial costs of Somalia since 1991
Humanitarian and development aid $13 billion
Remittances $11.2 billion
Peacekeeping, military responses, military 
aid, counterterror, and diplomacy 
 $7.3 billion
Piracy  $22 billion
International crime and illicit financial flows  $2 billion
Total since 1991 $55.3 billion
Major human costs of Somalia since 1991
Deaths 450,000 to 1.5 million
Refugees more than 800,000
Internally displaced people more than 1.5 million
AP Photo / FArAh Abdi WArsAmeh
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Western and regional efforts to reduce the terror threat by establishing a central 
government in Somalia have failed to improve governance. A recent confidential 
audit of the Somali government suggests that in 2009 and 2010 some 96 percent 
of direct bilateral assistance to the government had simply disappeared, presum-
ably into the pockets of corrupt officials.19 The repeated failure of international 
efforts to produce positive change in Somalia has generated fatigue among donors 
at a time when Somalia’s needs have never been greater.
“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” is rightfully a well-worn adage. 
Yet in the world of foreign policy it is an exceedingly difficult credo to translate 
from convenient talking point into practice. As much as policy experts and oth-
ers, including the U.S. secretary of defense, call for sensible investments in crisis 
prevention, international development, and expanded diplomatic capabilities, the 
default setting of the U.S. government and its partners in the international com-
munity is to scrimp on crisis prevention while pouring money into crisis response 
and containment. By and large, the U.S. government ends up spending far more 
time and money responding to crises or tinkering with tactical responses than 
preventing crises or nurturing effective peacebuilding efforts. This paper explores 
the staggeringly high cost of this approach by looking at the case of Somalia. 
This research tries to determine—using a variety of official and unofficial sources 
and some educated guesswork—a reasonable estimate of the financial cost of 
Somalia’s conflict since 1991. We tried to be as exhaustive as possible in determin-
ing the money spent on Somalia by the international community, regional actors, 
and the Somali diaspora, regardless of the specific intentions of spending and 
whether these expenditures were sensible and effective or not. It is our hope that 
the data explored in this paper can provide the foundation for a useful cost-benefit 
analysis of what has and has not worked in Somalia. We welcome any additional 
insights into our methodology and findings.
The profound lack of reliable data and the enormous variance in the economic 
and political standing of Somalia’s regions complicated our efforts. Statistics from 
the relative success story of Somaliland are conflated with the catastrophic figures 
from southern Somalia. (So, for example, the absence of development funding 
to the south is partially obscured by recent, significant increases in funding to 
the relatively stable, democratic northern enclave of Somaliland.) Extrapolations 
based on partial or unreliable data are noted in the text, and unless otherwise indi-
cated all statistics given in this paper reflect data from southern Somalia, Puntland, 
and Somaliland. 
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Our research also makes no attempt to calculate the indirect costs or the pos-
sible “benefits” of state failure in Somalia. We can assume that Kenya and Ethiopia, 
among other states, have suffered a reduced gross domestic product as a result of 
the ongoing disorder in Somalia. But they also may have accrued certain benefits. 
For instance, Somalis annually purchase half a billion dollars of khat (a highly 
addictive narcotic plant native to East Africa) imports from Ethiopia and Kenya, 
and the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi has seen a tremendous economic boom 
as a result of Somali diaspora investment. Kenya also has profited from humanitar-
ian traffic through its ports and its status as an international development hub. 
These benefits would to some extent offset the costs of state failure in Somalia. 
Future iterations of the research will attempt to better capture these dynamics.
Despite the shortcomings in available data, however, a useful snapshot of the 
total funding dedicated to Somalia since 1991 emerges. And it reveals a number 
of compelling and sometimes surprising trends that should begin to shape policy 
approaches. Additionally, this accounting makes clear that Western policymak-
ers are wildly uneven in their approach to Somalia. They are willing to spend vast 
sums in some areas such as dealing with piracy, while in other areas they take an 
approach bordering on malignant neglect. 
Somalia is fairly modest in size, its territory equivalent to an area slightly smaller 
than Texas. Its population, estimated at just more than 10 million people, is 
slightly larger than Michigan’s, and its estimated annual gross domestic product is 
smaller than that of Togo, Guam, or the Faroe Islands. Yet since Somalia became 
one of the world’s premier examples of a country seemingly in permanent crisis in 
1991, the international community has poured enormous resources into this small 
patch of land, and no end is in sight. Indeed, the humanitarian needs of Somalia’s 
population are escalating sharply, and the dire situation in that country could 
again trigger some kind of extraordinarily expensive major international interven-
tion beyond the scope that we have seen to date. 
The cost of Somalia’s ruin is nothing short of staggering. There is certainly a heavy 
human toll: Between 450,000 to 1.5 million Somalis have died due to violence 
or hunger in the ongoing conflict, and more than 2.3 million Somalis are still 
refugees or displaced. But the cost of international humanitarian aid, peacekeep-
ing forces, responding to piracy, and myriad other interventions have steadily 
accumulated year after year. 
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In what is a conservative estimate the international community, including the Somali 
diaspora, has collectively spent just over $55 billion responding to Somalia since 
1991. These costs have grown far higher and manifested themselves in ways that few 
would have imagined when the crisis truly began to unravel in 1991 and 1992.  
Before turning to the data we need to make several fundamental points. 
First and foremost, none of this research is to argue that we should no longer assist 
Somalia with its pressing humanitarian needs. Indeed, if anything, the data com-
piled here indicate the need for long-term development, defensive, and diplomatic 
strategies to mitigate Somalia’s long-running tragedy. 
In many ways the pattern of international intervention in Somalia has long 
remained in the unhappy middle: insufficiently robust or well designed to resolve 
the country’s conflicts but far too heavy handed and frequent to allow the country 
to resolve its own problems. Many of the interventions in Somalia were so badly 
planned and implemented that they made the overall situation far worse in the 
long run.
Second, this report recognizes that the conditions within Somalia vary widely 
by region. Somaliland and other parts of the north have achieved a far greater 
degree of stability and self-governance than the south. These divergent condi-
tions on the ground lead some to question the viability of Somalia’s borders as 
currently constructed. Somaliland has long sought international recognition as 
an independent state.
Other key considerations arising from our research include: 
Failed states are rare but incredibly expensive and disruptive
“Failed state” is a loaded term, and it’s clear that there are only a handful of coun-
tries around the globe in which the government has broadly collapsed. Numerous 
commentators point out that warnings of potential failed states happen far more 
often than they actually occur, and many weak states never actually collapse. 
Nevertheless, the costs to the world of those states that do fall into ruin are 
immense and long lasting. Policymakers show a disturbing tendency to view such 
weak or failed states first and foremost as a threat to national security because they 
can become a hotbed of terrorist activity—as has often been argued in Somalia 
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and Afghanistan. Yet the figures in this study make clear that the reverberations of 
a state unraveling are felt well beyond specific security concerns about counterter-
rorism and can play out in everything from making regional conflicts more likely 
to rising insurance rates for companies trying to conduct business within the 
general vicinity of a failed state. 
A surprisingly wide number of actors bear these costs
Somalia and its misery were distant from the minds of most Americans or 
Europeans until the onset of the recent famine. But there would be a far greater 
cry for effective diplomacy and policy approaches if people understood the wide 
variety of actors who ultimately bear the brunt of Somalia’s failure. Because the 
costs of Somalia are diffused across many actors, no one group of actors has 
“owned” the crisis, and interventions have been piecemeal.
Indeed, as these numbers make clear everyone from the Department of Defense 
to insurance companies and humanitarian relief organizations to law enforcement 
officials end up pouring resources into dealing with Somalia that could be used 
for far more productive and lasting benefit if Somalia could emerge from its failed 
state status. Sadly, it is equally important to understand the motivations and inter-
ests of those actors who benefit from Somalia’s continuing misery and stateless-
ness, including arms traders, smugglers, local warlords, and others. 
Somalia needs the right kind of aid
Somalia’s history makes clear that not all international aid is sensible or effective. 
If we hope to avoid future failed states we need to be much more principled and 
effective in how we deliver aid. 
The U.S. government generously contributed to the Siad Barre regime in Somalia 
during the 1980s. Barre’s government was widely recognized as horrible when it 
came to democracy and human rights, but aid was showered upon Barre because 
he was seen as an important Cold War ally and a bulwark against Soviet expan-
sionism in the region. 
Today, the United States, in pursuit of its modern counterterror objectives, provides 
continuous indirect financial and military support to Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government despite its proven record of corruption, rampant and admitted use of 
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child soldiers, and frequent inability to maintain control of territory.20 In fact, the 
TFG’s record of governance is probably worse than Siad Barre’s in many regards.
The Cold War is over, but governments in North America and Europe still deliver 
aid to governments that remain slow to embrace democracy and reform their 
institutions. The TFG has consistently pushed for more aid in recent years, but it 
won’t make much sense to do more in Somalia beyond humanitarian relief unless 
the world figures out how to approach its interventions more wisely. 
Failed states need comprehensive and locally appropriate solutions
Helping a country emerge from its status as a failed state is incredibly laborious 
and can take years of patient and hard-nosed diplomacy. This also means that the 
most successful efforts to turn around a situation like Somalia will be built upon 
effective international coordination, the constructive involvement of the private 
sector, and a willingness to make hard long-term choices. 
This is quite a departure from current practice. Too often the international response 
to the situation on the ground in failed states is to lunge toward quick “fixes” that 
fail to and may actually exacerbate the dynamics of conflict. While U.S. counterter-
rorism efforts have led to the death or capture of a number of high-value targets, 
the country’s primary extremist group, Al Shabbab, retains a worrying capacity to 
attract international recruits and to launch terrorist attacks in the region. 
U.S. support for the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia—which generated wide 
public support for Al Shabbab—remains a particularly egregious example of an 
ill-advised tactical approach to Somalia that yielded disastrous long-term results. 
Before delving into the costs, however, readers unfamiliar with the country’s his-
tory may benefit from some background on Somalia’s conflicts, which we turn to 
in the next section.
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Background: A brief history of the 
Somalia conflict 
The Somali Republic was founded in 1960 from territory contained in the colony 
of Italian Somaliland and the British protectorate Somaliland. In 1969, after nine 
years of democratic government, Somali military officer Siad Barre seized power 
via a military coup and declared Somalia a socialist state. Somalia was initially 
a client state of the Soviet Union, but President Barre flipped allegiance to the 
United States after Somalia invaded the contested Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 
1977. The United States proffered aid despite President Barre’s poor human rights 
record, and clan divisions within Somalia sharpened under his corrupt rule. 
Clans opposed to President Barre toppled the government in 1991 and seized 
the capital city of Mogadishu. After deposing Barre, the warlord-led clan factions 
quickly descended into intense internecine battles, plunging Somalia into a violent 
civil war. The lawlessness helped compound a devastating famine as large num-
bers of refugees fled to neighboring countries. 
Effective national governance has never been restored despite multiple efforts by 
Somalis and the international community.
In December 1992 the United States in conjunction with the United Nations 
implemented a series of missions—UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II—to 
protect food aid from looting. By most accounts the initial international interven-
tions were quite effective in meeting their humanitarian goals. Yet things turned 
considerably for the worse when U.S. forces became engaged in an open-ended 
effort to oust Mohammed Farah Aideed, who was at the time the most powerful 
warlord in Mogadishu.
Somali militias shot down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters over Mogadishu in 
October 1993 as Aideed resisted efforts to be ousted. Nineteen American ser-
vicemen were killed and hundreds of Somalis lost their lives in the ensuing battle. 
After the American public’s sharply negative response to this incident, the United 
States withdrew from Somalia by March 1994. The United Nations followed suit 
in early 1995. 
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Northwest Somalia, which declared itself the independent Republic of Somaliland 
in 1991, established a democratically elected government and remained largely 
stable since the early 1990s. But it has never achieved international recognition.
Repeated attempts at peace talks were largely stillborn as low-level conflict 
between warlords and other militia groups continued throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s. In 2004, however, peace talks resulted in the formation of a 
transitional federal government, or TFG. It was hoped that the TFG could be 
developed as a government of national unity. But it represented a narrow swathe 
of interests and clans in Somalia, and it has often been seen as lacking basic legiti-
macy and competence among much of the public. 
By 2006 a loose alliance of Somali businessmen and local Islamic courts, known 
as the Islamic Courts Union, emerged as the TFG’s most serious opposition. In 
June 2006 the union was propelled to power by a public uprising against a U.S.-
backed coalition of warlords, and it secured control of Mogadishu and much of 
southern Somalia. 
While the Islamic Courts Union established a degree of stability in areas under 
its control, both the United States and Ethiopia remained implacably opposed to 
the group because of its links to Islamist extremists and militant groups seeking 
to overthrow the Ethiopian government that were backed by long-time Ethiopian 
rival Eritrea. Indeed, Somalia has frequently served as a proxy battlefield for 
Ethiopia and Eritrea who remain mired in a long-standing border dispute.
Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006, with the TFG on the verge of 
military defeat by Islamic Courts Union forces. The United States provided intel-
ligence and military support for the Ethiopians, who quickly took over substantial 
territory while unfortunately reinforcing the notion that the TFG was more of a 
foreign creation than a local one. 
An African Union peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, was established in early 2007 
to support the TFG. The opposition to the TFG and the occupying Ethiopian 
army evolved into a complex mosaic of Islamic and secular militias, and more than 
400,000 people were driven from their homes in Mogadishu during 2007 as fight-
ing continued. The TFG continued to be riven by internal tensions in addition to 
widespread accusations of corruption and incompetence.
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A U.N.-brokered peace accord was reached between the TFG and a key opposi-
tion militia in June 2008. But more extremist groups, including a hardline Al 
Qaeda-linked splinter faction called Al Shabbab, resisted peace talks. Despite the 
peace accord, Al Shabbab came to control increasingly large parts of southern 
Somalia. TFG and AMISOM peacekeepers were able to largely protect the TFG 
leadership, but struggled to exert broader control. 
Somalia again faced a growing humanitarian crisis in 2008 and 2009 as more than 
1 million people were displaced from their homes because of renewed fighting. 
In 2008 there was also a sharp spike in piracy along the coast of Somalia that has 
continued to this day in operations that remain extremely lucrative for the pirates. 
Pirate groups have operated primarily in the better-governed northern and central 
districts of Somalia and largely avoided the political and military struggle between 
the TFG, Al Shaabab, and other militias. 
In the summer of 2011 a major famine again hit East Africa with Somalia faring 
the worst because of its protracted violence and instability. Delivering relief sup-
plies has remained especially difficult because Al Shabbab has denied aid workers 
access to key parts of the country, and the United States has imposed restrictions 
on the delivery of aid fearing that it would be diverted to Al Shabbab. 
Al Shabbab withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011 in a move that took most 
observers by surprise, ceding the city to TFG and AMISOM forces. The extremist 
group still retains considerable force strength and resources, however. The United 
Nations and others cite Al Shabbab as playing an increasingly instrumental role in 
fomenting Islamic extremist groups in the region despite continued targeted attacks 
on Al Shabbab and its senior leadership by both Ethiopia and the United States. 
We now turn to the costs these conflicts have imposed on Somalis and the interna-
tional community since 1991.
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The human toll of Somalia’s 
conflicts 
First and foremost, Somalia continues to be a human disaster of immense propor-
tions. This was true even before it was again battered with famine. The country’s 
ongoing conflicts and profound dysfunction have exacted a very steep cost on 
Somalis for years. 
Parts of Somalia remain in such dire conditions that it is challenging to arrive at 
clear figures regarding its population. The U.N. Development Program usually does 
not even rank Somalia on its Human Development Index—its annual barometer of 
country-by-country development levels—simply because basic data on the coun-
try are lacking. Making matters worse, increasingly large parts of Somalia are now 
suffering a major famine aggravated by the inability of international relief agencies 
to deliver aid in territory controlled by Al Shabbab—an inability that stems both 
from Al Shabbab’s threats and from restrictive U.S. government counterterror laws 
that seek to prevent aid from falling into Al Shabbab’s hands.
The data that are available make clear the impact of Somalia’s conflict upon its 
own citizens. Between 450,000 and 1.5 million people have died in Somalia’s 
conflict or directly due to hunger since 1991.21 This total reflects excess mortality, 
or the difference between the actual deaths in Somalia and the number of deaths 
Between 450,000–1,500,000 excess deaths caused by Somalia’s 
intermittent conflicts
More than 800,000 current refugees; average of more than 
581,000 refugees every year since 1991
More than 1,500,000 current internally displaced; average of 
more than 772,000 internally displaced every year since 1991
AP Photo/Jerome delAY
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that we would expect for a peaceful, decently governed country with the same 
demographics. The huge variation in the mortality numbers only underscores the 
general weakness of the Somali state and its institutions. 
The number of fatalities, however, is likely on the high side of this range given 
that the United Nations estimated 300,000 deaths in 1991 and 1992 alone and 
the recent sharp spike in mortality due to hunger and disease, particularly among 
children.22 The U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Somalia noted in July 2011: “In 
Forced to flee their homes
Somali international refugees and internally 
displaced, 1991–2011
Year
Number of 
refugees
Number of 
displaced
1991 700,00026 1,500,00036
1992 1,000,00027 2,000,00037
1993 575,00028 1,600,00038
1994 631,000 500,00039
1995 639,000 300,00040
1996 637,00029 250,00041
1997 608,000 200,00042
1998 558,000 250,00043
1999 525,000 350,00044
2000 476,000 300,00045
2001 440,000 400,00046
2002 432,000 300,00047
2003 402,300 350,00048
2004 389,300 375,00049
2005 396,000 400,00050
2006 395,00030 400,00051
2007 1,000,00031 1,000,00052
2008 476,00032 1,277,00053
2009 530,00033 1,550,00054
2010 600,00034 1,410,00055
2011 800,000+35 1,500,000+56
Sources of data include the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Forced 
Migration Online Research Guide to Somalia, the Norwegian Refugee Council, UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S. Agency for International Development, and 
ReliefWeb. See endnotes for full citations. Numbers have been rounded to the 
nearest thousand.
the last few months, tens of thousands of Somalis have died as 
a result of causes related to malnutrition, the majority of whom 
were children.”23  
In addition, more than 25 percent of the country’s entire popula-
tion is currently a refugee or internally displaced person, or IDP 
(someone driven from his or her home who has not crossed an 
international border). The United Nations estimates that more 
than 800,000 Somali refugees are in neighboring states, and 
more than 1.5 million Somalis are currently displaced. (see 
chart) An April 2011 statement from the United Nations also 
notes: “The number of Somali refugees arriving to neighbor-
ing countries during the first quarter of this year has more than 
doubled in comparison to the same period in 2010.”24 As of July 
2011 some 3,500 people per day were pouring out of Somalia 
into refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia, with 80 percent of 
those people being women and children.25
The numbers of refugees and displaced are even more striking 
when we look at the historical trends. Over the last two decades 
the numbers of refugees and displaced have gone up and down 
by large numbers at various junctures. This makes clear that 
Somalia not only suffers from large numbers of people that are 
refugees or displaced for a considerable period of time but also 
continues to endure wave after wave of new fighting that triggers 
new refugees and newly displaced persons. 
Significant numbers of IDPs and refugees have returned to their 
homes and communities in periods during the last 20 years. But 
that does not mask the fact that Somalia’s chronic insecurity 
meant that very large numbers of citizens were forced to flee 
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Somali refugees in the region as of April 2011
SOMALIA
Indian Ocean
Gulf of Aden
Red Sea
Mogadishu
4,593
187,282
15,392
103,534
394,487
18,561
34
7,572
1,282
6,848
42,104
1,581
Y E M E N
E R I T R E A**
D J I B O U T I
E T H I O P I A
K E N Y A
UGANDA
1,500
0
TANZANIA
10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
Puntland
139,000 IDPs
South/Central
1,253,000 IDPs
Total number of refugees
725,349
Total number of IDPs*
1,460,000
Total number of Somali refugees
Refugee influx since January 2011
Somaliland
67,000 IDPs
Sources: UNHCROffices, Various IDP assessments including the Somalia IASC PMT project Global Insight digital mapping © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.
* Total IDP figures are estimates. They are based largely on data obtained from the Population Movement Tracking System, which is not designed to calculate cumulative population data, only population movement trends.
** April 2011 refugee figures for Eritrea are currently unavailabe. March 2011 figures were used.
Figures on Somali refugees comes from UNHCR Offices in neighboring countries. The data shown on this map was provided primarily in March-April 2011. 
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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their homes during any given year. Indeed, if one averages the trends over the 
last 20 years, Somalia had more than 581,000 refugees and more than 720,000 
displaced every single year for more than two decades. (see chart)  
Further, the influx of Somali refugees in neighboring states places additional 
stresses on already fragile countries including Kenya (more than 430,000 Somali 
refugees), Ethiopia (more than 158,000 Somali refugees), and Yemen (home to 
close to 200,000 Somali refugees). (see map)
U.N. High Commission for Refugees spokesperson Melissa Fleming said on April 
29, 2011 regarding the Somali refugees arriving in Yemen: “Some of the new arriv-
als told us that they were unaware of the political and social upheaval in Yemen, 
but many coming from Somalia said they had no other option but to flee. For 
these Somali refugees the situation in Yemen was still, by comparison, much safer 
than the one back home.”57  
Meanwhile, the recent stories of Somali refugees fleeing into Kenya and Ethiopia 
are devastating. Mothers are frequently forced to abandon their children literally 
by the side of the road. 
These are just some of the many indicators that make clear that the instability that 
emanates from within Somalia affects a surprisingly broad swathe of countries and 
interests across the region and beyond.
Finally, Somalia suffers a staggeringly high mortality rate for children under age 
5—225 of every 1,000 children die before they reach their fifth birthday.58 This 
means that tens of thousands of children under the age 5 die every year in Somalia 
from preventable causes. Still more alarming, these estimates are from before the 
famine began, which makes it almost certain that Somalia now has the highest 
under-five mortality rate in the world in addition to the highest malnutrition rates 
in the world.  
Not only does Somalia continue to suffer today but capacity and hope are steadily 
being robbed from future generations. Primary school enrollment is shockingly 
low at 36 percent for boys and only 24 percent for girls.59 These indicators are likely 
to plunge further given recent events. These children will probably require more 
humanitarian assistance, be less economically productive, and more likely to be 
drawn into continued conflict or piracy because they have few other alternatives.  
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Somali civil society activist Ahmed Dini observed of Somalia’s youth: 
This is a group of people who have never known anything other than conflict 
and violence. They have never had stability in their lives; they moved from one 
displacement to another with little possibility of getting an education or any 
other opportunity to earn a decent livelihood. Some join the violence by being 
recruited into the fighting groups; others find drugs, such as khat and narcotics, 
as a way out; while others undertake very dangerous sea journeys to Europe or 
the Gulf Arab states. If we don’t find a solution to the youth problem, Somalia’s 
problems will continue into the next 20 years.60
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Humanitarian and development 
spending on Somalia
Humanitarian assistance has provided an essential lifeline to millions of Somalis 
given the enormous numbers of refugees and displaced in Somalia accompanied 
by the general collapse of Somali state institutions. Most development funds in 
recent years were directed to the north of Somalia rather than the south simply 
because security in the south is so poor that most international NGOs and con-
tractors are unable to operate on the ground. 
Historically the United States was the largest donor of humanitarian aid to 
Somalia, though recent restrictions on the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assis-
tance to Somalia have cast sharply into doubt continued American leadership in 
aid. Indeed, Al Shabbab’s repugnant and continued efforts to block humanitarian 
relief workers, coupled with U.S. restrictions designed to ensure that aid does not 
flow to Al Shabbab as an organization, have made Somalia’s famine one of the 
most difficult access challenges the international community has faced in decades. 
Further, international spending per capita on Somali’s displaced population (as 
compared to the country’s refugees) remains far lower than in many other situ-
More than $9.2 billion total humanitarian and 
development aid in Somalia since 1991, an average of more than 
$439 million annually
More than $3.2 billion total caring for Somali refugees in 
other countries. That is more than $152 million annually
$682 million in arrears to the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the African Development Bank that will likely need to 
be written off
AP Photo/JohN moore
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A lifeline for millions
Humanitarian and development assistance funding to Somalia by year61
Year
Humanitarian and 
development funding
Private individuals 
and donors (20 percent)
Total
1991 $185,800,000 $37,200,000 $223,000,000
1992 $652,900,000 $130,600,000 $783,400,000
1993 $889,800,000 $178,000,000 $1,067,900,000
1994 $535,000,000 $107,000,000 $642,000,000
1995 $187,700,000 $37,500,000 $225,300,000
1996 $88,100,000 $17,600,000 $105,700,000
1997 $80,900,000 $16,200,000 $97,000,000
1998 $80,400,000 $16,100,000 $96,400,000
1999 $114,700,000 $23,000,000 $137,600,000
2000 $101,000,000 $20,200,000 $121,200,000
2001 $147,700,000 $29,600,000 $177,300,000
2002 $146,800,000 $29,400,000 $176,200,000
2003 $173,700,000 $34,700,000 $208,400,000
2004 $198,700,000 $39,700,000 $238,400,000
2005 $237,000,000 $47,400,000 $284,300,000
2006 $391,000,000 $78,200,000 $469,100,000
2007 $384,100,000 $76,800,000 $461,000,000
2008 $762,200,000 $152,400,000 $914,600,000
2009 $661,700,000 $132,3000,000 $793,400,000
2010 -- -- $750,000,000 estimate62
2011 -- -- $1,250,000,000 estimate 
Total $9,222,200,000
This data is drawn from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s International Development Statistics on Somalia. The column on private and indi-
vidual donors is extrapolated from the Official Development Assistance, or ODA, and Other Official Flows, or OOF, totals, with it being reasonably estimated that private 
charities and other sources not captured by the Official Development Assistance totals gave a sum equal to 20 percent of the official total for any given year. Numbers 
have been rounded to the nearest $100,000.
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ations around the globe. This forces many of these populations to adopt other 
coping mechanisms in order to survive.
In addition to the considerable costs of humanitarian assistance and development 
aid spent within Somalia, we should also consider the costs of caring and feed-
ing Somali refugees in other countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen as an 
underlying cost of Somalia’s long conflict. Large numbers of Somali refugees also 
have begun fleeing to Ethiopia trying to escape not only conflict but a worsening 
drought in their home country. 
Using the total number of refugees over 21 years listed in chart above, and conser-
vatively estimating that the international community spent $185 per refugee annu-
ally, the world has spent $2.2 billion since 1991 aiding Somali refugees—more 
than $106 million annually. Additionally, the international community will likely 
spend another $1 billion in 2011 aiding the surging number of refugees in neigh-
boring states according to recent appeals from the United Nations and others. This 
brings those annual costs of assisting refugees to over $152 million annually. 
Worryingly, the cost of aiding these refugees on a per capita basis has begun to rise 
sharply in recent years as food and fuel prices have spiked. This suggests that the 
international community and refugees may be in the unenviable position of seeing 
more and more money spent with the amount of actual aid delivered remaining 
flat or even declining. 
Most of the aid spending on Somalia from international financial institutions is 
reflected in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development data 
cited earlier in this section. But there is another cost: As of August 2010, Somalia 
was in arrears to the International Monetary Fund $365.7 million, the World Bank 
$231.3 million, and the African Development Bank $85 million for a total of $682 
million in arrears.63 It is highly unlikely that these arrears will be repaid (some of 
Somalia’s arrears date back to the mid-1980s) and most of the country’s central 
financial institutions have long since collapsed, so we can assume that they will 
be written off and can thus be considered a legitimate cost of Somalia’s continued 
conflict. Somalia’s arrears account for 17 percent of the total arrears owed to the 
IMF. As a result of Somalia’s instability a declaration of its ineligibility to access 
IMF resources has been in place since 1988.64  
The World Bank also established a Reconstruction and Development Program for 
Somalia budgeted at $2.2 billion U.S. dollars in January 2008 after a joint needs 
The cost of caring for 
refugees
Estimated international 
spending per Somali refugee by 
year, 1994 to 2009
Year
Spending per 
refugee
1994 $114
1995 $117
1996 $133
1997 $149
1998 $149
1999 $188
2000 $181
2001 $173
2002 $212
2003 $255
2004 $231
2005 $268
2006 $243
2007 $237
2008 $240
2009 $311
Jeremy Konyndyk of Mercy Corps prepared this 
analysis, and he acknowledges the challenges 
of arriving at a fully accurate cost. His estimates 
generated an approximate figure for per capita 
Somali refugee spending in 2006, calculating 
from U.S. contributions toward UNHCR and the 
World Food Program for Somalia-specific activities 
and extrapolating from the average U.S. share of 
those agencies’ budget to estimate a total global 
figure. This 2006 base figure is then adjusted to 
estimate other years’ levels based on year-by-year 
shifts in overall U.S. per capita global refugee fund-
ing to arrive at the global figures cited in the.  The 
ultimate figures are not intended to be precise but 
should be indicative of likely cost levels.
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assessment with the United Nations Development Program, or UNDP.65 But only 
those funds currently expended are totaled in this report. 
Perhaps most frustratingly, the more than $13 billion total spent on humanitarian 
and development assistance for Somalia and on Somali refugees since 1991 did 
not lead to enduring and sustainable improvements in Somalia and its capac-
ity. Lives were indeed saved and protected, but the absence of more effective 
approaches to reaching a durable peace agreement, shoring up weak institutions, 
or addressing security concerns means that Somalia’s cycle of conflict and despair 
remains unbroken and is indeed currently intensifying. 
Without a real change in approach the international community could well con-
tinue spending billions of dollars every year to treat symptoms of Somalia’s long 
crisis, such as its refugee population, without making any strategic gains or taking 
any real steps toward resolving the conflict.
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Remittances from the Somali 
diaspora
Remittances are a key feature of the landscape in many developing countries. But 
in Somalia they consistently help the population survive. 
While considerable attention naturally focuses on what the international commu-
nity spends on Somalia’s myriad problems it is essential to underscore the fact that 
the Somali diaspora are one of the most consistent and generous donors in trying 
to help their friends and relations survive. The U.S. State Department currently 
estimates that around $2 billion a year is directed toward Somalia in remittances, 
and the World Bank estimated at different junctures that Somalia is one of the 
most remittance-dependent countries in the world with remittances making up 
more than 70 percent of the country’s gross national product in 2006.66 
This incredible level of support from expatriate Somalis does much to explain 
the country’s resiliency despite repeated calamities and long periods of relative 
neglect by the international community. The World Bank argues that “the major 
inflow of ‘aid’ has come from Somalis themselves.” 
It is crudely estimated that Somalia has received some $17.3 billion in remittances 
since 1991. Sixty-six percent, or $11.2 billion, of this total can be reasonably esti-
mated as spending that has been directed toward costs imposed by the impact of 
Somalia’s largely collapsed national institutions on its own citizens.67 The 66 percent 
total derives from World Bank estimates that note that two-thirds of all remittances 
Somalis abroad have sent more than $11.2 billion in 
remittances back to their country—an annual average  
of $533 million
AP Photo/rAdu sigheti 
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in Somalia are usually directed toward consumption on basic needs including food, 
education, and health costs—spending that would not have to be directly under-
written by Somalis overseas if it were not for Somalia’s continuing conflict. 
Remittances continue to be overwhelmingly directed to main towns and urban 
areas versus rural areas in Somalia, and they remain the main source of income for 
many families struggling to survive. 
A 2008 report by the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development notes: “Over 1 million Somalis live and work abroad (out of a total 
population of 9 million) and sending money back home has become a focal point 
in their lives. Substantial sacrifices are often made by those who send money 
home and most Somalis remit to numerous people.”68 
The report continues: “Remittances have a significant effect on the standard of 
recipients and often make the difference between whether a family survives or not.” 
In short, Somalis themselves continue to pay enormous financial and personal 
costs for their country’s collapse.
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Peacekeeping, military responses, 
military aid, antiterrorism, and 
diplomacy costs
Peacekeeping, military aid, counterterror efforts, and even predator drone attacks 
are all part of the international community’s approach to containing and mitigat-
ing Somalia’s crisis. 
In some cases this military involvement is direct, such as through the U.S. involve-
ment in peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s or the launch of predator 
drone attacks on suspected terrorists. Other times, Somalia serves as a proxy 
battleground where military assistance from the United States and others is fun-
neled to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi for their role in trying to shore up weak 
governments in Somalia. 
Because weapons transfers and other assistance are sometimes covert, it is impos-
sible to arrive at exact figures in this arena. But solid estimates are indeed possible. 
Peacekeeping missions
UNITAF, UNOSOM I and II, and USFORSOM $4.4 billion
African Union Peacekeeping Mission, AMISOM $798 million
AMISOM Trust Fund $39 million
Arms transfers $735 million
Military and police training $145 million
Military involvement of 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti
$444 million
Drone strikes, surveillance, and counterterrorism 
efforts
$495 million
U.N. office on Somalia and other diplomatic efforts $193.7 million
Cash payments to warlords $105 million
Total since 1991 $7.3 billion
AP Photo/mohAmed sheikh Nor
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Some analysts also note that the period from 1995 to 2006 when the international 
community provided relatively scant military assistance to Somalia was also 
one of the more peaceful periods within the country. This poses something of a 
chicken-and-egg question: Does the world only pay attention to Somalia when 
violence flares or are some of the interventions from the international community 
actually playing a role in escalating violence?
What follows are some of the most obvious costs in these arenas:
U.N. and U.S. military operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I,  
UNOSOM II, and UNITAF)
The United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM I, was established in 
1992 to “provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equip-
ment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliver-
ies of humanitarian supplies.”69 UNOSOM I’s mandate was expanded in August 
1992 to deal with areas throughout Somalia. Then a coalition of some 30 nations 
known as the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, was established in December 1992 
to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
UNOSOM II took over UNOSOM I and UNITAF in 1993 to continue securing 
the supply of humanitarian assistance, including through enforcement measures. 
The United States led UNOSOM II, and at one point it provided 28,000 troops to 
the operation. Through disarmament and reconciliation projects, repatriation of 
refugees, political reconciliation, peacebuilding, and mine-clearing it was man-
What it costs to keep boots on the ground 
in Somalia
Military costs of UNOSM I, UNOSM II, and U.S. 
forces in Somalia, or USFORSOM
U.S. costs for all military operations $2 billion 71
UN Costs: UNOSOM I $400 million
UN Costs: UNOSOM II $1.6 billion72
Additional direct costs, U.S. and U.N. 
combined
$400 million73
Total $4.4 billion
This chart is reproduced from: Mike Blakely, “Somalia.” In Andrea Kathryn 
Talentino, editor, Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory 
and Practice (Ohio University Press, 2006).
dated to complete the task UNITAF initiated. UNOSOM II was 
withdrawn in March 1995.70 (see chart for mission costs) 
The U.S.-led military intervention was an initial success in dra-
matically reversing the humanitarian situation in Somalia. But 
the effort dissolved into an unsuccessful and muddled attempt at 
state building and pursuit of individual warlords that culminated 
in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident where several 
dead U.S servicemen were dragged through the streets after a 
protracted and deadly gun battle in downtown Mogadishu. 
The poor handling of these interventions left Somalia chaotic 
and the international community badly wary of becoming 
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directly involved on the ground—not only in Somalia but in Africa as a whole. 
Black Hawk Down has frequently been blamed for the United States’s tragically 
slow response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
African Union Mission to Somalia, AMISOM
The African Union Mission to Somalia, or AMISOM, was launched by the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Council in January 2007 with an initial six-month 
mandate. AMISOM’s mission is to support the structures existing under the tran-
sitional federal government, or TFG; support a new national security plan; train 
Somali security forces; and protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The 
mission continues to be renewed approximately every six months and is ongoing. 
While making some important gains on the ground, AMISOM is still unable to 
control any territory outside of the capital city. The TFG remains troubled and 
largely ineffectual, and Al Shabbab, though weakened, still maintains considerable 
resources. 
In terms of cost, the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly has appro-
priated some $798 million for AMISOM since July 2008 according to the U.N. 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The United 
States and European Union are the leading donors to AMISOM. The United 
States has provided over $185 million in training, logistics, and equipment 
between 2007 and 2010.74 The European Union gave $297 million between 2007 
and 2011.75 (see chart)
A costly mission
Total U.N. Security Council and General Assembly 
spending on AMISOM, July 2008 to June 2012
Year Expenditure
July 2008 – June 2009 $75,642,00076
July 2009 – June 2010 $213,580,00077
July 2010 – June 2011 $205,221,00078
July 2011 – June 2012 $303,912,00079
Total AMISOM financing 
2008 -2011
$798,355,000
All figures are from the United Nations. Figures have been rounded to the nearest 
$ thousand.
Nations also fund the U.N. Trust Fund that supports 
AMISOM.80 The Trust Fund was initiated by Security Council 
Resolution 1863, which called for financial assistance to 
AMISOM in accordance with the 2008 Djibouti Agreement that 
established a ceasefire between the TFG and an armed opposi-
tion group. The endowments to the Trust Fund for 2010 and 
2011 are shown below:81
In many ways AMISOM represents an effort by Western powers 
to manage security on the cheap. Rather than deploy an effective 
and genuinely robust international peacekeeping presence with 
a mandate to protect the Somali population, the West instead 
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keeping mission,” AMISOM offers little protection to the civilian population, and 
worse, it is even widely accused of indiscriminate fire that may have killed hun-
dreds if not thousands of Mogadishu’s citizens.
Arms transfers
External actors were more than willing over the years to direct military supplies 
and training to Somalia’s combatants. This support has been incredibly varied 
in its sources and aims, including everything from bilateral support for police 
training to back-channel funds directed toward terrorist cells operating out of 
Mogadishu. A full and accurate account of such spending is impossible. But we 
can ascertain some of the largest likely costs involved in this effort. 
The amount of weapon transfers to and within Somalia is staggering even though 
Somalia has been under different degrees of U.N. arms embargoes since 1992. 
Such transfers tend more toward light weaponry than heavy weaponry, and the 
trends in arms traffic drifted up and down over the last two decades. 
The United Nations offers some insight into this trend: 
The volume of arms flows has not been constant. In 1991 the collapse of the pre-
vious government released the stocks of the former armed forces into the internal 
Individual country contributions to AMISOM
Donor funding for AMISOM Trust Fund, 2009 to 2011
Donor Year Expenditure
Australia 2009 – 2010 $383,000
Czech Republic 2009 – 2010 $150,000
Japan 2009 – 2010 $9,000,000
Republic of Korea 2009 – 2010 $500,000
Malta 2009 – 2010 $13,000
Turkey 2009 – 2010 $500,000
United Kingdom 2009 – 2011 $20,815,00082
Germany 2009 – 2010 $3,647,000
Saudi Arabia 2010 – 2011 $2,000,000
Denmark 2010 – 2011 $1,800,000
Total Trust Fund Financing 2009 – 2011 $38,808,000
All figures are from the United Nations. Figures have been rounded to the nearest $ thousand.
chooses to use regional militaries, periodic high-
tech interventions, proxy military assistance, 
and indirect support to private security contrac-
tors as a way to be able to reach out and strike at 
specific terrorist targets on the ground. 
It is no wonder that this strategy is often been 
likened to the children’s game of “Whac-a-
Mole.” It is a repetitious and neverending 
process of pursuing terrorists without funda-
mentally altering the environment that allows 
them to flourish. 
AMISOM is able to defend the TFG from 
being overwhelmed by Al Shabbab’s forces. But 
it is not effective in helping the TFG stand on 
its own. Despite being mandated as a “peace-
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market. Between 1992–94 there were significant arms acquisitions from Central 
Europe. After 1994 it is believed that the volume of arms flowing in was low as 
the amount of arms already in the country was very high. The volume is said 
to have increased in the period 1997–2000 as a side effect of the war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. From late 2001 there is said to have been another rise 
in the level of arms coming into Somalia as a part of the competition between 
Somali groupings in advance of the anticipated conference of concerned parties 
in Nairobi under the auspices of the IGAD. [IGAD, or the Inter-governmental 
Authority on Development, is an organization of six East African countries 
focused on development and drought control.]83 
A subsequent spike in arms transfers occurred again with the 2006 Ethiopian inva-
sion of Somalia and the proxy battles waged in Somalia both between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea and the United States and various armed opposition groups.  
The U.N. Group of Experts, which has done some of the most authoritative report-
ing on Somalia’s conflict, details numerous arms embargo violations over the years 
as well as the flow of weapons permitted under exemptions to the embargo. The 
United Nations notes that Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, Uganda, the United States, 
and other countries were all important sources of weapons in Somalia, including 
ammunition, assault rifles, rocket launchers, missiles, grenades, helicopters, and 
antitank weapons.84 Ammunition appears to be the most pressing need in the con-
flict, which is a sad testament to the saturation of weapons across the country. 
A 2004 U.N. report noted that commercial imports, mainly from Yemen, were 
considered the most consistent source of arms for Somali opposition and crimi-
nal groups.85 The lack of scanners and port security along the border makes such 
trade difficult to control. While this trade was curbed for a period of time it may 
again become more pronounced with recent disturbances in Yemen.86 Most of 
these arms transfers have been from nonstate actors in Yemen rather than the 
government of Yemen. 
A U.N. report from 2007 notes:  “Arms have been either openly brought into 
Somalia, as in the case of the Ethiopian and African Union forces, or brought 
in through clandestine channels, as in the cases of the Eritrean conduit and the 
Bakaraaha Arms Market, for example, and variously distributed to the Shabbab, 
clans, warlords and others.”87 
The arms market remains a major part of Somalia’s fractured economy. Al Ittihad 
extremists, one of the many armed opposition groups operating in Somalia, are 
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strongly involved with the arms market and weapon transfers. There is obviously a 
strong correlation between the cycle of violence and the ready availability of arms 
through the large and pervasive Somali arms market.88
But the United States also plays a role in bringing weapons into the country. In May 
2009 the U.S. government applied for an embargo exemption to supply $2 million 
in cash to TFG forces to purchase weapons, which came in part from Somali arms 
markets.89 Then, in August 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged 
military support for the TFG that included at least 40 tons of military weaponry 
and equipment.90 Arms included assault rifles, machine guns, grenades, and mor-
tars.91 Uganda also delivered some 94 tons of weapons to Somalia in 2009 and 2010 
with the United States reimbursing Uganda for these deliveries.92
A U.N. Group of Experts report in 2008 cited frequent breaches of the arms 
embargo by the Somali Police Force. It suggested that the force purchased 
weapons inside and outside of Somalia as it became increasingly militarized.93 
Appallingly, the U.N. Group of Experts estimates that 80 percent of Somali train-
ees from the government security forces either deserted or defected, often with 
their weapons, uniforms, and equipment. This implies that the arms and other 
material supplied to the TFG frequently is diverted on to the black market.
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea are key players in shipping arms to Somalia, too. 
Somalia often serves as a proxy battleground between these two states. The United 
Nations notes that Ethiopia frequently supplied weapons to its allies in Somalia 
even though it did not apply for exemptions from sanction to do so.94 
Based on investigations in 2010 the Government of Eritrea provided political, dip-
lomatic, financial, and military assistance to armed opposition grounds in Somalia. 
These groups included ARS-Asmara, Hizbul Islam, and Al Shabbab. Cash transfers 
were also sent through Eritrean embassies in Kenya, Djibouti, and Dubai. They 
were typically about $40,000 to $60,000 at a time for each group in addition to 
funds for specific operations. 95  
This support goes back several years. The U.N. Monitoring Report in 2007 said 
that Eritrea provided significant political, financial, and material support to oppo-
sition groups.96 And in 2008 an investigation found that arms were being shipped 
to the Al Shabbab from Eritrea to Mogadishu. The arms included grenades, 
detonators, pistols, rifles, and machine guns.97 The government of Eritrea helped 
Hassan Dahir Aweys return to Somalia in April 2009 to lead Hizbul Islam, yet 
another armed opposition faction. 
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Eritrean support for armed opposition groups has lessened in response to inter-
national pressure, but it has not gone away entirely. Recent reports indicate that 
Eritrea continues to send arms to Somalia in small boats.98
There are also credible indications that Iran and Al Qaeda have direct links with Al 
Shabbab. It’s entirely possible that this includes operational training and financing. 
Iran also provided funding to the TFG in the past.99 What’s more, according to 
information revealed in the Wikileaks imbroglio, Algeria sent some 30 tons of arms 
to the TFG in 2009 or 2010.100 Finally, weapons looted from Libyan stocks during 
that country’s civil war may now be finding their way to Somalia according to back-
ground discussions by the authors with international diplomats covering Somalia. 
All told, the authors conservatively estimate that more than $35 million annually 
in illegal arms have flowed into Somalia over a period of 21 years—accounting for 
$735 million in arms costs, though this figure is obviously speculative. 
Training of Somali police and military
A variety of other countries and intergovernmental organizations have also trained 
Somali police and military. 
The head of the TFG’s armed forces said in October 2009 that more than 3,000 
Somali military and police forces were being trained in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, 
and Uganda.101 In 2009 the European Union pledged to pay 72 million euros for 
security in Somalia, and 12 million were for training the police force and building its 
capacity. Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and the Arab League also pledged 
money in 2009 toward Somali’s security sector.102 Unfortunately much of the police 
training mentioned above does not adhere to international human rights standards. 
The United States, too, has sponsored extensive training for Somali security forces 
at bases outside of Somalia, and there has been an active debate about the degree 
to which the United States is actively assisting the TFG with logistics and intel-
ligence support.103 
A conservative estimate for international training of Somalia’s police and army is 
$145 million based on available data. 
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Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti military involvement 
Ethiopia has spent considerable sums of money—and suffered extensive casual-
ties—in its multiple interventions in Somalia. It occupied significant parts of 
Somalia from 2006 to 2009 with troop levels estimated to be between 8,000 
to 15,000 personnel. The Ethiopian force was equipped with tanks, helicopters, 
heavy artillery, and considerable logistical support. 
These were costly affairs. Given Ethiopia’s annual defense budget of $390 million 
it is reasonable to estimate that the Somalia intervention consumed some 20 per-
cent of the military budget between 2006 and 2009 (or $234 million over those 
three years), 10 percent of Ethiopia’s military budget in 2010 and 2011 (or $78 
million), and at least 5 percent of Ethiopia’s military budget from 1991 to 2005 
(or $97.5 million.)104 This makes for a total of $409.5 million of Ethiopian military 
spending directed toward Somalia in some fashion.
U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia is driven in no small part by that country’s 
willingness to serve as a proxy force in Somalia. The United States has provided 
Ethiopia with more than $50 million in assistance since 2002, and at least 20 per-
cent of that total or $10 million should be reflected as supporting Ethiopian activi-
ties in Somalia given that the United States has encouraged Ethiopia’s role.105
Thus we see that as a conservative total Ethiopia has spent some $419.5 million on 
its military posture related to Somalia. 
Uganda and Burundi, for their part, have deployed a total of 9,200 soldiers to sup-
port the TFG as part of the AMISOM mission. Both countries are largely reim-
bursed by the African Union and other international donor mechanisms for their 
troop contributions. 
Western powers appear content to keep these peacekeeping forces in Somalia 
in perpetuity despite the considerable expense. But some voices in Uganda and 
Burundi question the wisdom of these deployments. 
Wafula Oguttu, spokesman for Uganda’s opposition Forum for Democratic Change 
party, has pushed for his government to pull Ugandan peacekeepers from Somalia. 
He noted in July 2010: “There is no peace to keep in Somalia. We’re just sacrificing 
our children for nothing.”106 
Peacekeeping, military responses, military aid, antiterrorism, and diplomacy costs | www.americanprogress.org 29
Djibouti’s involvement is of a lesser extent, and it is largely not kinetic. But it 
includes military support such as radio programs and publications against  
Al Shabbab. 
So, all told, we could estimate that Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti have 
spent some $444 million on Somalia. 
International peacekeeping casualties
Casualties for peace missions in Somalia continue to mount. 
UNITAF suffered 8 killed and 24 wounded during its five-month deployment in 
Somalia. Ten additional staff were killed in accidents.107 During UNISOM I and II 
some 300 U.N. troops were killed and approximately 461 wounded.108 The likely 
number of AMISOM and Ethiopian casualties are much higher. AMISOM has suf-
fered approximately 750 fatalities since January 2007, and Ethiopian military casu-
alties were perhaps as high as 100 per week by the end of its occupation according 
to experts familiar with AMISOM speaking on background to the authors. 
Drone strikes, surveillance, and counterterrorism efforts
Since the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States has 
pursued a wide range of counterterrorism objectives in Somalia. 
For instance, the U.S. military conducted several aerial strikes against high-value 
terrorist targets operating within Somalia, and in 2011 launched its first drone 
strike in Somalia. The Washington Post reports that the total cost of a drone strike 
is more than $1 million apiece.109 And in addition to the cost of the aerial strikes 
themselves we can reasonably assume that each attack required extensive satellite 
surveillance and attention from senior intelligence and military analysts. 
Further, recent reports suggest U.S. intelligence operatives and contractors are 
active on the ground in Somalia and that the United States maintains one or more 
secret detention facilities in the country.110 U.S. intelligence agencies also lent con-
siderable support and training to their TFG counterparts, and TFG officials called 
for further expansion of this support. 
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The ongoing cost of aerial attacks, intelligence tracking, and intelligence agency 
assets operating on the ground is likely well in excess of $495 million using a fairly 
conservative estimate of $45 million in annual spending for a period of 11 years. 
It’s true that this heavy U.S. counterterrorism presence in Somalia led to the suc-
cessful targeting of some high-level Al Shababb and Al Qadea affiliated figures. 
Yet the continued failure to establish an effective central government in Somalia 
coupled with Al Shabbab’s considerable financial assets suggests that the United 
States may be winning the battle but losing the war even with Al Shabbab’s retreat 
from Mogadishu in the summer of 2011. There are increasing signs that Somalia 
is serving as a regional hub for extremism, the country’s famine is placing an enor-
mous burden on neighboring states trying to cope with refugees, and there are no 
indications that Somalia’s role in undermining regional security and stability will 
end any time soon—nor will the often destructive adventurism of neighboring 
states in Somalia.
Diplomacy
The U.N. Political Office for Somalia, or UNPOS, has been in operation since 
1995 following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. The relatively small office located 
in Nairobi tracks political developments within Somalia and tries to encourage 
peace processes. The 2010 budget for UNPOS was $17 million in 2010, and 
approximately $136 million has been spent on this office since its inception.111 
The United Nations also established a panel of experts in 1992 that was succeeded 
by a Monitoring Group to track the political situation in Somalia as well as monitor 
the arms embargo. Average annual expenditures for these efforts, including staff 
time in New York, is likely in the range of $700,000 annually for a total of $15.7 
million, by extrapolating from the rough data made available by the United Nations.
There have been numerous attempts at convening peace talks and confer-
ences on Somalia over the years, including the 1993 Conference on National 
Reconciliation, the 1997 National Salvation Council, the 1997 Cairo Peace 
Conference, the 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference, the 2002 Somali 
Reconciliation Conference, the 2003 National Reconciliation Conference, the 
2004 Nairobi Conference, the 2007 National Reconciliation Conference, and 
the ongoing Djibouti process. A very rough estimate of costs for these respective 
efforts by the authors is $42 million. 
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The costs of maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Somalia, such as the 
Somalia unit at the U.S. embassy in Kenya, are not counted as an extraordinary 
cost of Somalia’s conflict. 
The grand total of all these diplomatic efforts is $193.7 million. 
Cash payments to Somali warlords
Last but not least, the CIA made payments to Somali warlords totaling “hundreds 
of thousands of dollars” in an effort to capture suspected terrorists believed to be 
hiding in Somalia.112 As noted, the Ethiopians, Eritreans, Al Qaeda, and even Iran 
also engaged in providing their favored warlords with financial support. 
This figure is probably the most difficult of all to ascertain. But even a modest $5 
million a year in payments over the course of the conflict would suggest that $105 
million has been expended in cash payments. Actual figures are likely higher.
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Piracy
Somali piracy is a serious problem that is getting worse. Countries are increasingly 
forced to spend billions on ransoms, insurance premiums, re-routing ships farther 
out to sea, naval forces, and other expenditures as attempts and attacks rise. 
Somali pirates attacked over 154 ships in the first half of 2011. Twenty-one ships 
were successfully hijacked with a total of 362 hostages on board.113 The graph at 
left shows the increase of piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa between 1997 and 
2010. 
These attacks cost tens of billions. One Earth Future Foundation, or OEF, pub-
lished a comprehensive report on the costs of Somali piracy at the end of 2010. It 
echoed previous reports from the United States Institute of Peace114 and Chatham 
House.115 OEF estimates that in 2010 the costs of Somali piracy to the global 
economy ranged between $7 billion and $12 billion.116 These figures include the 
costs of ransoms, excess insurance premiums for ships traveling through the Gulf 
of Aden, re-routing ships to avoid high-risk regions, security costs, naval forces, 
prosecution of Somali pirates in foreign courts, piracy deterrent organizations, 
and the impact on regional economies. (For purposes of this report we have used 
the low end of all of OEF’s estimates.)
The costs are broken down below:
Piracy cost more than $22 billion from 2005 to 2011
More than 154 ships were attacked in the first half of 2011; 21 were 
successfully hijacked
Growing Bolder
Attempted and successful 
piracy attacks off the Horn of 
Africa, 1997 to 2010
Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 
Annual Reports 1997-2010, Compiled by One 
Earth Future Foundation.
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What we paid for piracy last year
Total costs of maritime piracy, 2010
Cost factor Details Value (dollars)
Ransoms: excess costs
Ransoms paid to pirates have increased from an average of $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 
2010. The total cost of piracy only includes the excess cost of ransoms since the cash value paid is 
encompassed under insurance premiums (see below). Excess costs of ransom emerges for multiple 
reasons such as delivery of the ransom (often by helicopter or private plane), ships being held and 
out of service, and trauma counseling. 
$176 million117
Insurance premiums
This is assessed through the two main excess premiums related to piracy: kidnap and ransom, and 
war risk premiums. 
$460 million 
Re-routing ships
OEF estimates that at least 10 percent of ships re-route their voyages to avoid high-risk piracy 
regions. 
$2.4 billion
Security equipment Companies often attempt to protect their ship by using security equipment and/or armed guards. $363 million
Naval forces
The cost of naval deployments off the Coast of Somalia is accounted for through: (1) the cost of 
each naval vessel deployed; and (2) the logistical budgets of each of the big three naval opera-
tions: EU’s Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, and the multinational Combined 
Task Force 151 operation. 
$2 billion
Prosecutions
Over 750 Somali pirate suspects were either tried or awaited trial in more than 11 countries in 
2010. 
$31 million
Piracy deterrent organizations
Multiple intergovernmental organizations and trust funds are dedicated to finding a solution for 
maritime piracy. 
$19.5 million
Cost to regional economies
Somali piracy has ripple effects on economies of East Africa and beyond, affecting trade, invest-
ment, and stability. 
$1.2 billion
Total estimated cost $7 billion
Source: One Earth Future Foundation
What we paid for piracy in previous years
Total costs of maritime piracy, 2005 to 2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cost of ransoms $80,000 $90,000 $240,000 $44 million $104 million $237.6 million
Insurance premiums $120 million $459 million $459 million
Cost of re-routing ships $2.3 billion $2.3 billion
Security costs $368 million $368 million
Cost of naval efforts $1 billion $ 2 billion $2 billion
Cost of prosecutions $31.3 million
Piracy deterrent organizations $19.5 million
Loss to regional economies $322 million $1.1 billion $1.3 billion
Total cost $80,000 $90,000 $240,000 $1.4 billion $6.3 billion $6.7 billion
Total cost of piracy, 2005-2010 $15 billion
Source: One Earth Future Foundation
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It’s difficult to locate exact data on the costs of piracy for previous years. But some 
OEF estimates  between 2005 and 2010 are shown above. Note that a number 
of the costs do not kick in until about 2008 when the shipping industry, insur-
ance companies, and navies were forced to adapt their operations and charges to 
respond to the increasing threat of piracy. 
Data are not yet available to assess the costs of piracy in 2011. We can, however, 
predict that the costs will likely increase from the costs in 2010 due to a number 
of developments related to piracy including the classification of the entire Indian 
Ocean as a war risk zone (meaning ships transiting through the region are subject 
to excess premiums); increasing use of deterrence mechanisms on board ships, 
such as citadels (safe rooms) and private armed security; and the increasing 
region being attacked by pirates. 
We can therefore assume that piracy will cost at minimum $7 billion in 2011. If we 
add this figure to the total costs between 2005 and 2010 we can estimate that Somali 
piracy has cost the global economy at least $22 billion between 2005 and 2011. 
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International crime and illicit 
financial flows
Given Somalia’s relatively lawless state in many areas the country continues to be an 
attractive base area not only for terrorist organizations and arms traffickers but for a 
range of other illegal activities as well, including drug trafficking. Costs in these areas 
are particularly challenging to track with a high degree of accuracy. But several areas 
are worth particular mention and we can estimate some broad stroke costs. 
Drug interdiction
The United Nations notes that a country like Somalia “is attractive to interna-
tional drug trafficking syndicates as they are quick to exploit non-existent or 
ineffective border (land, sea, and air) controls, limited cross border and regional 
cooperation as well as serious deficiencies in the criminal justice systems.”118 
Somalia has only become a more active transit point for narcotics with the spike 
in piracy in recent years.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, or UNODC, notes that there 
were very few major seizures of drug shipments in Somalia between 1995 and 
2006. But UNODC also makes clear that this is not good news. Instead, the lack 
of seizures is more a reflection of the ability of drug traffickers to operate from 
Somalia with relative impunity. 
Drug interdiction costs $1.05 billion
Illicit financial flows since 1991 $804 million
Law enforcement investigations and trials $405 million
Total cost $2 billion
AP Photo/mohAmed sheikh Nor
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Antonio Maria Costa, the head of UNODC, commented on Somalia’s growing 
status as a hotbed for illegal activity in 2009: “Mainly because of the dramatic situ-
ation in Somalia, the region [East Africa] is becoming a free economic zone for all 
sorts of trafficking drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous waste and natural resources, 
in addition to having the world’s most dangerous waterways because of piracy.”119 
Costa suggested that some 30 to 35 tons of heroin from Afghanistan alone flow 
into East Africa each year, and Somalia is at a convenient nexus between Asia, 
Africa, and Europe for drug traffickers.
Somalia is also the world’s largest per capita consumer of the narcotic plant khat 
and a key transit center for that drug. Khat is highly addictive, but it is legal in 
much of sub-Saharan Africa while outlawed in Europe and North America. 
Much of the drug is grown in Ethiopia and Kenya, and The Washington Post 
estimated that Kenya was exporting $250 million of khat annually in 2006 with 
much of that headed for Somalia for domestic consumption or shipment abroad. 
The Post noted: “Dozens of flights leave Nairobi’s two major airports every day, 
transporting burlap sacks filled with khat to Somalia in a trade that is worth 
about $300,000 a day, according to Kenya’s National Agency for the Campaign 
Against Drug Abuse.”120 
Here in the United States the Customs Service seized 3,000 kilos of khat from 
airports around the country during a two-month period in 2002.121 In July 2006 
the Drug Enforcement Administration, working with other organizations, coordi-
nated the takedown of a 44-member international narcotics trafficking organiza-
tion responsible for smuggling more than 25 tons of khat worth more than $10 
million from Somalia to the United States.122
Not only is the drug trade itself troubling, but the revenue directly benefits 
some of those most opposed to peace including pirates, warlords who control 
airstrips and docks, and terrorist groups.123 It can be conservatively estimated 
that Somalia’s continuing drug trafficking adds some $25 million annually to the 
costs of enforcement in both North America and Europe. This cost ranges across 
coast guards, customs agents, law enforcement officials, the judiciary, and others. 
(Indeed, that is very likely a low-end estimate.) 
This would suggest that Somalia’s continued drug trade has imposed $1 billion in 
costs on the international community since 1991.
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Law enforcement investigations
It is clear that law enforcement officials, courts, and other investigators in the 
United States and Europe are investing enormous resources in both investi-
gating terrorist incidents that already occurred in Somalia and were linked to 
Somalia, while spending even more energy, time, and money trying to prevent 
future attacks from occurring. These investigations span multiple law enforce-
ment agencies across multiple continents ranging from the FBI to Interpol to the 
Minneapolis Police Department.
A series of recent events underscore Somalia’s frequent use by international terror-
ist groups as a safe haven and the increasing radicalization of some Somalis living 
in the United States. 
•	 In October 2008, after a Somali-American teenager from Minnesota, Shirwa 
Ahmed, committed a suicide bombing in Somalia, the FBI began investigating 
if he was radicalized by a Somali Islamic group in the United States.124 This was 
believed to be the first instance of a U.S. citizen participating in a suicide attack. 
•	 The FBI then began following the trail of over a dozen young men missing from 
Somali communities in many U.S. cities, including Minneapolis, Boston, and 
Columbus, Ohio, to investigate whether young men from Somali enclaves in 
the United States were returning to their parents’ country to fight on the side of 
radical Islamic terrorist organizations.125 
•	 In May 2009 the FBI stepped up investigations of Somalis living in the 
Washington, D.C. area, claiming that these men held “militant” anti-American 
views and sympathized with Al Qaeda.126
•	 In April 2011 the FBI went into Somalia and arrested Mohammad Shibin, the 
man who was allegedly in charge of the ransom negotiations of four Americans 
held hostage and subsequently killed by pirates.127  
•	 In June 2011 the FBI announced that one of two suicide bombers who attacked 
a TFG checkpoint in Mogadishu, Somalia on May 30 was another Minnesota 
man who had returned to Somalia to fight for Al Shabbab.128 
•	 In July 2011 the Obama administration announced that it would bring Ahmed 
Warsame, a senior Al Shabbab official, to the United States for trial. Warsame 
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allegedly played a key role as a middle man between Al Shabbab and Al Qaeda, 
and he tried to arrange weapons deals between the two.   
Intelligence and law enforcement officials widely agree that individuals involved in 
the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Mombasa and Nairobi transited through 
Somalia after the attacks. And the latest U.N. monitoring report notes that Al 
Shabbab is playing an increasingly important role in serving as a hub for jihadist 
groups operating throughout the region. 
Law enforcement agencies do not compile their budgets based by origin of 
threat. It is conservatively estimated by the authors that international law enforce-
ment agencies have spent $45 million annually over the last decade responding 
to enforcement and investigative challenges arising from Somalia for a total of 
$450 million. Somalia’s neighbors—particularly Uganda since the July 2010 Al 
Shabbab-directed terror attacks at two nightclubs in Kampala—are also dedicat-
ing significant and growing resources to tracking and monitoring Al Shabbab 
networks and sympathizers. 
Illicit financial flows
Since the beginning of Somalia’s civil war to the present, $804.4 million has left 
the country in illicit capital outflow according to the watchdog group Global 
Financial Integrity.129 This is capital that could have been put to better use devel-
oping infrastructure and stimulating economic opportunity within Somalia.
These illicit financial flows include a broad range of proceeds from bribery and 
theft by government officials to resources generated through drug trafficking, 
racketeering, counterfeiting, and commercial tax evasion. 
Data in the table below highlight the illicit financial flows by year. The trend 
suggests that the amount of illicit capital outflow has increased almost every year 
since 1991—with the exception of 1991-1992 and 1997-1998—with no signal of 
slowing anytime soon.
Dirty money leaving 
Somalia
Illicit financial flows by year, 
1991-2008
Year Illicit financial flows 
1991 $12.4 million
1992 $11.5 million
1993 $13 million
1994 $14.6 million
1995 $17.8 million
1996 $26 million
1997 $30.1 million
1998 $26.6 million
1999 $28.1 million
2000 $32.9 million
2001 $35.5 million
2002 $38.5 million
2003 $48.8 million
2004 $64.6 million
2005 $73.2 million
2006 $90.4 million
2007 $112.3 million
2008 $128.1 million
Total $804.4 million
Source: Global Financial Integrity.
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Conclusion
Somalia remains a tragic case study of the international community getting it 
wrong repeatedly. From propping up the brutal regime of Siad Barre in the 1980s 
to greenlighting the disastrous Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, the United 
States in particular shows an almost willful disregard for sensible diplomacy or the 
kinds of patient, grassroots engagement that might have helped Somalia achieve a 
greater level of stability at different junctures. 
Sadly, an entire generation of Somalis now view the “state,” whether it is the TFG 
or Al Shabbab, as a largely predatory institution that should be feared. This makes 
a lasting peace all the more difficult. 
What’s more, the estimate of the more than $55 billion spent by the international 
community on Somalia since 1991 is assuredly on the low side particularly given 
that the impact on Somalia in terms of lost economic opportunity and growth 
across the Horn of Africa would likely dwarf all the costs detailed in this report. 
At a time when the fiscal climate in Washington is extraordinarily difficult—and it 
is highly likely that the United States in particular will reduce its commitment to 
both diplomacy and development around the globe—it is all the more vital that 
we approach conflicts like Somalia with sensible long-term strategies rather than 
knee-jerk responses. The cost of any other approach is simply too high.
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